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Message from the Editors
In 2008, the Naval War College established the Center on Irregular
Warfare & Armed Groups (CIWAG). CIWAG’s primary mission is
twofold: first, to bring cutting-edge research on Irregular Warfare into the
Joint Professional Military Educational (JPME) curricula; and second, to
bring operators, practitioners, and scholars together to share their
knowledge and experiences about a vast array of violent and non-violent
irregular challenges. This case study is part of an ongoing effort at
CIWAG that includes symposia, lectures by world-renowned academics,
case studies, research papers, articles, and books.
Dr. Antonio Giustozzi is the author of this case study, which
focuses on the Taliban. This case study was created to focus on two
specific challenges that our experienced operators and practitioners face in
Afghanistan: how to understand the actors and the complex irregular
warfare environment; and how to manage interaction, adaptation, and
reassessment in irregular warfare.
In this case study, Giustozzi relies on his extensive experience in
Afghanistan as a researcher to create an insightful analysis of the Taliban.
The author discusses a wide range of topics including assessments of the
Taliban’s strengths and weaknesses, their ability to reassess and adapt as
well as their operational and strategic successes and failures. We believe
he has presented a balanced treatment of the subject matter. Balance,
however, does not mean that the case study will be uncontroversial. In
fact, Giustozzi’s analysis contains some rather blunt appraisals of many of
the major actors in this conflict; including both ISAF and the Taliban.
This version of the case study was submitted in October 2011. We
are at work on addendums that focus on individuals or specific factions
within the Taliban network including the Haqqani network. The point is to
make these case studies part of an evolving and adaptive curriculum that
3
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fulfills the needs of students preparing to meet the challenges of the post
9/11 world.
Keep in mind that the questions and issues that this work raises go
far beyond the Taliban and the borders of Afghanistan. By focusing on
one type of armed group—the Taliban—and understanding its weaknesses
and vulnerabilities, we are able to extrapolate what factors contribute to
the success or failure of armed groups in general. We can examine the
inter-relationship between the goals, strategies, and operational and
tactical capabilities of other armed groups. For example, these groups can
suffer from strategic overextension and they can reach past their
culminating point of attack and even culminating point of victory. The
question is, how do we recognize these opportunities and what can we do
to take advantage of them?
It is also important to note three critical caveats to this case study.
First, the opinions found in this case study are solely those of the author
and do not represent the views of the Department of Defense, the Naval
War College, or CIWAG. Second, while every effort has been made to
correct any factual errors in this work, the author is ultimately responsible
for the content of this case study. Third, the study questions presented in
all CIWAG case studies are written to provoke discussion on a wide
variety of topics including strategic, operational, and tactical matters as
well as ethical and moral questions confronted by operators in the
battlefield. The point is to make these case studies part of an evolving and
adaptive curriculum that fulfills the needs of students preparing to meet
the challenges of the post-9/11 world and to show them the dilemmas that
real people faced in high-pressure situations.
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Author Biography
Dr. Antonio Giustozzi is a Research Fellow at the Crisis States Research
Centre at the London School of Economics. He works on the security
dimention of failed states and states in a critical situation. He also
researches the political aspects of insurgency and warlordism and states’
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Acronyms and Terms
ANA – Afghan National Army
ANBP – Afghanistan New Beginning Program
ANCOP – Afghan National Civil Order Police
ANSO – Afghan NGO Security Office
COIN – Counter Insurgency
DIAG – Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups
FATA – Federally Administered Tribal Areas
IED – Improvised Explosive Device
ISAF – International Security Assistance Force
KGB – The Committee for State Security, the Soviet National Security Agency
from 1954-1991
KhAD – Afghan Intelligence Service
MoD – Ministry of Defense
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NWFP – Northwest Frontier Province
OEF – Operation Enduring Freedom
SOF – Special Operations Forces
TTP – Tehrik-I-Taliban Pakistan, or Movement of the Pakistani Taliban
UHF – Ultra High Frequency
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Figure 1: Topographical Map of Afghanistan
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Figure 2: Political Map of Afghanistan (2008)
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Figure 3: Ethnic Map of Afghanistan
Note: The religious division between Sunni and Shiite Muslims almost
entirely coincides with that between the Hazara majority areas (Shiite) and
the other ethnic groups.
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I. Introduction
This case study analyses how the different sides in the conflict in
Afghanistan—primarily the Taliban and the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF)—have developed their strategies over time. The
emphasis is very much on the adaptation and counteradaptation process, in
which opposing sides evaluate each other, study each other, take each
other’s blows, and react by shaping up, changing, adapting. The more
flexible an adversary is, the more difficult to defeat; flexibility can make
up for an inferiority in resources and numbers. The capacity to adapt is an
indicator of flexibility, and that is why the case study will focus on this
aspect.
Much adaptation for the challenges of war has taken place on both
sides (less so within the Afghan armed forces). The insurgents have
invested great efforts in developing, adapting, or redeveloping asymmetric
tactics (IEDs, suicide attacks, targeted assassinations on a large scale,
etc.), while ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) have greatly
improved information gathering and their targeting of insurgent
commanders and leaders. Both sides have been looking at ways to
decentralize their fighting forces in order to operate more rapidly and
safely. Adaptation, however, always has trade-offs. For instance, targeted
assassination weakens the legitimacy of a fighting force, as does
indiscriminate violence. Similarly, decentralization makes command and
control more difficult.
Change and adaptation are not the same. Adaptation implies a
degree of success, whereas change is neutral—it can be successful or
unsuccessful. Even adaptation, however, is not necessarily enough if it
does not occur in a coherent fashion. ISAF/OEF’s counterinsurgency
effort has been erratic and inconsistent, with frequent changes of focus:
12
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some movement in one direction, then in the opposite, some adaptation of
the military effort coupled with little or no changes in the political effort.
Until 2010, the counterinsurgency effort had failed to contain the
insurgency, let alone defeat it. Much of the change that occurred before
2010 was appropriate, hence qualifying as adaptation, but its erratic
character prevented it from achieving the desired impact on the
insurgency. Developments from 2010 onwards are more difficult to
evaluate, but at least the ability to inflict damage on the insurgents
improved significantly; the political dimension of counterinsurgency still
appears to be very weak.
The key lessons from this analysis are as follows:

By 2001, Afghanistan had a long history of virtually
uninterrupted conflict, with a large number of people having experience of
war as protagonists and accumulating the know-how of fighting an
insurgency.

However, insurgencies are dynamic processes of adaptation
and counteradaptation. Insurgents, as much as counterinsurgents, have to
keep learning and being flexible and adaptable.

Although the Taliban took inspiration from the 1980s and
1990s, they had to innovate as the counterinsurgency pressure on them
increased. The actual tactics employed in the post-2001 guerrilla war were
in fact very different from those employed earlier, mainly because the
adversary had changed and was technologically much more resourceful.

No tactic or strategy is good or bad in itself; it just might or
might not fit a particular environment. The Taliban are neither particularly
efficient nor capable nor sophisticated as an insurgent movement, but they
have been able to match their limited human resources in management and
educational terms with appropriate strategy and tactics.

The Taliban’s modus operandi fits well with the
fragmentation of Afghan society. Rather than trying to regiment their rank
13
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and file according to rigid rules, they allow entrepreneurs of violence
much space within a limited set of basic rules they have agreed to, and in
fact rely on them for most tasks, including much of logistics.

There is a trade-off between the Taliban’s resilience and
efficiency, particularly insofar as their resilience is obtained through
decentralization.

14

GIUSTOZZI: TALIBAN NETWORKS IN AFGHANISTAN

II. The Taliban in Afghanistan: An Overview
A. Operation Omid
In 2009 to early 2010, the Taliban were at the apex of their power
in Zhari, a primarily Pashtun district in Afghanistan’s Kandahar province.
They controlled almost all of the rural areas, rarely challenged by the
government or the Canadian Forces. Taliban members openly roamed
around, maintaining a few hundred full-time fighters and administering
justice in several courts; their governor interacted with the population.
They grew over-confident, exposing themselves, showing their judges’
and administrators’ faces and identities.
When ISAF and the Afghan security forces moved in in force in
2010’s Operation Omid, Taliban losses were numerous, although they
pulled back most of their full-time fighters rather than confront the
advancing ISAF/Afghan forces. Elements hostile to the Taliban felt
encouraged to emerge and show their support for the government, even
forming a militia (Afghan Local Police) in a few villages. The Taliban
were no longer able to maintain permanent bases in the district.
However, this was not the end of the Taliban in Zhari. They
reorganized and adapted. As of July 2011, the number of full-time fighters
had not returned to its previous high but had recovered from the low
reached in Operation Omid’s aftermath. Re-infiltration occurred steadily
after spring 2011, but the Taliban now operated more discreetly, relying
on an underground structure in many villages, avoiding establishing
permanent bases, and rotating their full-time staff in and out of the district
more often than before. Their administrative and judicial structures were
now mobile and often staffed by people from outside the district, which
made it more difficult for the villagers to identify and relate to local
governance structures.
The Taliban succeeded in improving their organization to the point
where they could rotate military commanders between units, effectively
15
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merging what might have been several separate insurgencies into one and
strengthening command and control by the leadership. The Taliban’s
ability to use Zhari to infiltrate Kandahar might have been reduced, but at
the same time, as in several other districts of Helmand and Kandahar, they
were holding down a much larger ISAF and Afghan government force
while still controlling most of the population and making gains elsewhere
in the country. Perceptions count, and in the perception of the local
population, the Taliban were as much in control in July 2011 as they had
been before Operation Omid. Although it had been earlier assessed as a
success, in the longer-term perspective, the operation might only have
compelled the Taliban to evolve a few steps higher.
This vignette, one of a hundred such examples that could be drawn
from the current conflict in Afghanistan, raises two important questions
about the consequences of interaction and adaptation: What are the roots
of the Taliban’s way of warfare? How are they able to adapt and overcome
the fog and friction of conflict? The answer to both of these questions lies
in the history of conflict in Afghanistan and the social, economic, and
military consequences of protracted warfare on Afghan society.

B. A Brief Background
The Afghan communist government came to power with a military
coup in April 1978, prompting a jihad that continued in 1980 against the
Soviet army. (See Appendix A: Historical Context.) Every military
organization that has participated in the post-2001 conflict has its roots in
this jihad. This explains why non-state armed groups in today’s
Afghanistan are all Islamist, fundamentalist, or at least Islamic
conservative.1 The consequences of this conflict and the Afghanistan civil
1

While initially there was some leftist, chiefly Maoist, and nationalist participation in the
resistance movement, it waned because of the popular understanding of the conflict as a
jihad, which by its nature favored Islamic groups. and because of external support from
the United States, Pakistan, and Arab countries primarily focused on Islamists and
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war in the 1990s include the creation of a professional military class with
deep roots in society; the destabilization of social, political, and economic
life; and the accumulation of tactical and operational military knowledge.
The Taliban existed during the 1980s in the form of Taliban
guerrilla fronts, mostly associated with the clerical party of the
mujahideen, Harakat-i Enqelab-i Islami (Movement of the Islamic
Revolution). 2 The party as a whole demobilized in 1992 and barely took
part in the civil war.3 The Taliban emerged as an autonomous movement
in 1994 but did not adopt guerrilla tactics. They fought instead as a semiregular force, massing for conventional battles. Arguably, their military
organization was more in line with the available resources (human and
financial) than those of their rivals. Once they took Kabul in 1996, the
Taliban developed something more like a standing army, with some
artillery and armor and a small air force, and even incorporated some

fundamentalist groups. See G. Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending (London: Hurst, 2005);
Lawrence Malkin, “Afghanistan,” World Policy Journal 17, no.3 (2000); Geraint
Hughes, “The Soviet-Afghan War 1979-1989: An Overview,” Defense Studies Nov
(2008): 326-50.
2
Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending; this author’s personal interviews with former
mujahideen commanders, 2007-9; Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn, The
Enemies We Create (London: Hurst, forthcoming 2011).
3
For many readers, this overview of interaction and adaption in the period before current
US involvement provides sufficient background to understand the current context. There
is a detailed bibliography at the end of this case study on these issues, however, for those
who are interested in further research, it is worth mentioning some of the academic
resources on the topic. The best overall study of the period as far as political and social
dynamics are concerned is Dorronsoro’s Revolution Unending; in particular it features
the only scholarly analysis of the Taliban regime, as well as of the Taliban in 1994-6. As
an introduction to the world of Afghan militants, David Edwards’ Before Taliban is
excellent. Military tactics, organization and dynamics are discussed in Anthony Davis’
chapter (Taliban), Giustozzi’s Empires of Mud (the militias) and Olivier Roy’s articles
(‘War as a Factor of Entry into Politics’ and “Nature de la guerre en Afghanistan’).
Giustozzi and Roy in particular discuss the social dynamics underpinning changes in
military organization. Tactics in particular are discussed in Jalali/Grau, The Other Side of
the Mountain.
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officers of the former pro-Soviet army. The infantry, however, largely
continued to use the same tactics as in 1994-95.4
The guerrilla phase of the jihad (1981-91) is of the greatest interest
to us in order to understand post-2001 developments. Many of the tactics
developed in the 1980s were used from 2002 onwards, as were some
organizational techniques such as fighting on assigned fronts, a degree of
centralized control, communications, and the development of a
bureaucracy in Pakistan to oversee it all. Propaganda techniques and
themes were also based on those of the 1980s. The way the insurgents of
the 1970s and 1980s spread their influence presents some similarity with
post-2001 Taliban techniques: political agents testing the ground; small
teams moving in and securing the environment before more assets were
moved in and local recruitment started in earnest.
Although much of the attention today, and this case study, is
focused on the Taliban, in reality a variety of military-political actors have
some degree of influence on the Afghan scene. (See Appendix D: Other
Insurgent and Pro-Government Groups.) Pro-government non-state actors
have a major impact in all regions, particularly in the north. Within the
insurgency, smaller players like Hizb-i Islami play a significant role in
some regions, chiefly the east. The interaction among these groups differs
from region to region and is often complex, with alliances made and
unmade.
This complex interrelationship among different actors in the
insurgency characterizes the current conflict in Afghanistan and can be
illustrated by looking at the province of Baghlan in 2010.5 Both the
Taliban and Hizb-i Islami were active here by early 2010, sharing control
over Pashtun villages in the northern and northwestern parts of the
See Davis’s chapter in David B. Edward, Before Taliban: Genealogies of the Afghan
jihad (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).
5
See also the following documentary: Dispatches: Afghanistan: Behind Enemy Lines
[Video]. (2010). Retrieved September 27, 2011, from,
http://www.channel4.com/programmes/dispatches/4od#3111511.
4
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province. The Taliban also had a presence among Tajiks, having co-opted
some former commanders of Jamiat-i Islami, their ancient rivals. Hizb-i
Islami and the Taliban even shared use of the Taliban’s judiciary.6
However, tension existed between the two groups. The typical
member of the Taliban was of humbler social origins than Hizb-i Islami’s,
and the two groups competed for resources, in particular the apportioning
of tax collection. (See Appendix B: Afghanistan’s Economic
Environment.) The Taliban and Hizb-i Islami clashed repeatedly and
violently over tax collection apportionment in 2010, and Hizb-i Islami was
almost entirely eradicated as a result.
Tension also existed within the Taliban itself, between Pashtuns
and Tajiks. The Tajik commanders had been the first to side with the
Taliban in 2008 and received all the key positions at the provincial level,
such as shadow governor and military commander. They also were in
charge of the distribution of supplies and cash. During 2010, the Taliban
succeeded in mobilizing many Pashtuns in the province, and leadership
was transferred to a Pashtun governor and a Pashtun military commander.
In comparison, only a few small groups of Taliban operated among Tajiks,
mostly in remote areas. The Tajiks protested their lost influence by the
spring of 2010, suspending military operations and asking either to be
given a key position at the top or an entirely separate supply structure to
manage themselves. A number of Tajik commanders reconciled with the
Afghan government later that year.7

This is referred to in the video as the “judiciary of the Islamic Emirate.’
A. Giustozzi and Christoph Reuter, The Insurgents of the Afghan North (Kabul/Berlin:
Afghan
Analyst Network, 2011); A. Giustozzi and C. Reuter, The Northern Front: the Afghan
insurgency spreading beyond the Pashtuns (Berlin: Afghanistan Analysts Network ,
2010).
6
7
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Discussion Questions

1.
Could NATO forces have readapted and assessed their
tactics to leverage the Taliban vs. Hizb-i Islami and Pashtun vs. Tajik
infighting?
2.
What are the opportunities and pitfalls in aligning with one
tribe, clan, or political group over another? Is it a viable strategy for longterm success?
3.
Is it realistic to engage a community without brokering
with influential political, economic, and religious groups?

C. Structure and Organization
The Taliban is by far the largest opposition armed group in
Afghanistan, accounting for more than 80 percent of the total number of
insurgents. Their ideology can be described as Islamic fundamentalist, but
there are variations within the movement, with its eastern Afghan wing
(Peshawar shura) being more influenced by political Islamism. Although
the leadership of Mullah Omar over the Taliban is largely undisputed, the
extent to which the Taliban leadership is able to control its rank and file is
a matter of debate. It relies on a mix of incentives, rewards, and direct
orders to ensure a degree of compliance. Appointments to positions of
leadership are decided at the local level by consensus through
commissions appointed by the central leadership. Only when consensus
cannot be reached does the central leadership step in to make a decision.8
The Taliban have always been a collection of small religious
networks—a network of networks. The leadership has tried over the years
to create an organized structure to overlay these networks, presumably to
8

Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The Rise of the Neo-Taliban
Insurgency in Afghanistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); A. Giustozzi,
Negotiating with the Taliban: Issues and Prospects (New York: The Century Foundation,
June 2010).
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reduce the impact of personal conflict among network leaders. In a sense,
this could be described as an effort at institution building. Some success
was achieved in this regard, but the Taliban essentially were still a
network of networks in early 2011. The nature of these networks in the
south is predominantly religious, and the typical commander is a mullah or
a religious student (talib), although he might recruit on a tribal or subtribal basis. In the east (Peshawar shura), former mujahideen and other
non-clerical elements have a larger presence, even in leadership positions,
but the structure is still network oriented.9
The predominant or “mainstream Taliban” view is represented by
the leadership’s official position; at present, it argues for the expulsion of
Westerners from Afghanistan and also insists that the fighters respect rules
of engagement and of conduct determined by the leadership itself. Another
viewpoint is more radical. It is hostile to leadership’s effort to impose
rules of engagement, more inclined to utilize indiscriminate terror tactics,
and more inclined to cooperate with foreign jihadist elements. Once led by
Mullah Dadullah, who was killed in 2007, it has been in disarray since his
death but was considered to be in the ascendency in 2010-11, despite the
absence of a clear leader. A third, small, faction displays pro-Iranian
inclinations. There is also a more moderate tendency, not yet organized as
a faction, favorable to negotiations, whose size is difficult to gauge but
seems significant; some leaders at the national and local level allegedly
belong to this tendency, including Mullah Baradar.10

Giustozzi, “Negotiating…”; T. Ruttig, How Tribal Are the Taliban? (Kabul/Berlin:
Afghanistan Analysts Network , 2010).
10
Personal communications with UN officials, 2010; Linschoten and Kuehn, The
Enemies We Create; on Baradar see Carl Forsberg, The Taliban’s Campaign for
Kandahar (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War, 2009): 32.
9
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Internal Coherence and Ability of Political Leadership to Exercise
Control
The Taliban leadership has been steadily trying to increase the
degree of control it exercises over its rank and file. Its control has always
been stronger in the areas close to the Pakistani border, not least because
of the use of a courier system as well as the practice of summoning
commanders and local leaders to Pakistan for briefings. In areas where
military pressure is greatest, the leadership’s effort to exercise command
and control has been disrupted and the Taliban have readapted using an
almost completely decentralized system. In contrast, in areas where
military pressure has not been as high, they have maintained a tighter
control: examples are Zabul and Ghazni. Even in these areas, the senior
leadership is not able to completely or immediately impose its views and
has to rely on a degree of cooperation and sympathy from its local
leaders.11
In areas away from the Pakistani border, such as the provinces on
the Central Asian border, command and control from Pakistan is
particularly difficult. When combined with intense military pressure, the
local Taliban have often been thrown into disarray, as in Badghis in 2010
or Kunduz in 2010-11. The comparison between the southern and the
northern borders highlights the role of the Taliban system of command
and control in making the insurgency more resilient. The leadership
intervenes to replace losses and solve disputes, enabling the combatants to
focus on fighting; supplies and assistance can be made available, as well
as punishment and reward. The Taliban are known to have sometimes
punished and even executed their commanders for misconduct.12

11

Giustozzi, Decoding the New Taliban; interviews with Taliban members and
sympathizers, Ghazni, 2010.
12
A. Giustozzi and Christoph Reuter, The Insurgents of the Afghan North; Joshua
Partlow, “U.S. strikes at the heart of Taliban leadership,” Washington Post, October 24,
2010.
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Recruitment
Taliban mobilization first focused on recalling members of the
movement dispersed after defeat in late 2001. Their success in this regard
was mixed, with only a relatively small minority of former members
willing to get involved in a guerrilla war, with all the implications that this
has in terms of lifestyle, risk, and personal sacrifices. Their strongest
constituency after 2001 turned out to be the clergy, particularly the new
generation of Pakistani-trained mullahs. The clergy was upset by its
marginalization in post-2001 Afghanistan and by cultural changes that the
mullahs found unacceptable.13 The madrasas in Pakistan also provided a
steady flow of young recruits.
Taliban recruitment has been growing steadily since 2002, and
evidence suggests that recruitment was still going well in 2010, despite
increased pressure and some territorial losses. The overall level of
insurgent-initiated attacks increased by 54 percent in 2010, according to
ISAF, and by 64 percent, according to ANSO. This would have been
difficult to attain without some expansion of the ranks.14 What drives this
recruitment is a matter of debate. ISAF and the Afghan government tend
to present economic interpretations, claiming that most Taliban recruits
are motivated by the offer of payment by the organization. However,
evidence suggests that the main drivers of Taliban recruitment are
religious and ideological, at least as far as the full-time fighters and
political cadres are concerned.
Grievances abound in Afghanistan because of the fragmented
nature of society, which makes the distribution of aid, services and favors
unequal; in segmented societies there is always a potential for conflict, and
the Taliban have set out to exploit this.15 (See Appendix C: Afghanistan—
A Fragmented Society.) Their wider recruitment efforts were aimed at
13

Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop; Giustozzi, Decoding the New Taliban.
On ANSO, see www.afgnso.org.
15
Giustozzi, Afghanistan’s 30 Years War
14
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enlisting the support of local communities, exploiting local conflicts and
gaps in governance. Taliban political agents and preachers were
dispatched around the country to assess the potential of different
communities and exploit opportunities. Typically, communities subjected
to discrimination by government officials or that felt short-changed in the
post-2001 distribution of the spoils were most inclined to lend support to
the Taliban. The elders leading many communities initially might have
allowed the Taliban into their villages as a way to signal to the central
government their displeasure, but frequently later lost control over their
guests. 16
The Taliban also targeted perceived “loose cannons” within both
the rural and the urban populations for recruitment. In such cases, a
complex propaganda effort was mounted, including a variety of press
outlets and websites. Radio broadcasts have been more erratic because of
the difficulty of broadcasting deep into Afghanistan. Taliban propaganda
appears designed to exploit friction between the population and foreign
forces, which inevitably occurs and which has been intensifying over time
as the number of troops has increased. To at least some extent, the Taliban
have succeeded in becoming a vehicle for the expression of grievance;
since 2006, they have appeared as a serious opposition force with a strong
chance of forcing at least a new political settlement, if not outright victory.
Having reached this critical mass, even groups and individuals who do not
appreciate the Taliban from a religious or ideological point of view started
having relations with them.
Apart from their core fighters, probably numbering around 60,000
at the beginning of 2010 (roughly half being deployed in Afghanistan at
any given time), the Taliban boasts hundreds of political cadres and tens
of thousands of facilitators and supporters. The Taliban have also been
mobilizing communities to fight alongside them, motivated by the desire

16
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to defend the community against perceived external threats.17 Community
lashkars were mobilized in parts of Helmand, Kandahar, and Uruzgan,
particularly from 2006 onwards. Community mobilization occurred in a
few spots outside the south as well, but it has been rare—the best-known
example is Koringal valley in Kunar. Such lashkars have been fighting on
and off with the Taliban, but by 2010 they had mostly demobilized due to
heavy casualties.
The casualty rate is high, with Taliban sources acknowledging 500
killed in 2010 in Helmand alone, which has driven opportunists and
mercenaries away from the movement. Behavior in battle suggests a stern
commitment to the fight. Few Taliban are captured on the battlefield; most
prisoners are rounded up in their homes or seized in night raids. Finally,
from what can be gathered from ISAF concerning prisoner interrogation, it
is rare for Taliban members to claim to have been induced to fight by the
offer of economic rewards. They usually claim to be loyal to the Taliban
and seem to be closely identified with the movement. Certainly, recruits
have various motivations for joining the Taliban, varying from revenge to
indoctrination in madrasas to a lust for adventure, but it would seem that
the Taliban are doing a fairly good job at socializing members into the
movement.18
Ethnically, it is estimated that the Taliban is 93 percent Pashtun
and the remaining 7 percent a mix of Uzbeks, Tajiks, Pashais, and others
(see map for the ethnic breakdown of Afghanistan). Although modest, this
percentage of non-Pashtuns (who account for about 50 percent of the total

17

Accounts of the fighting in Helmand seem to clearly indicate the presence of such
community mobilization; the same can be said of Korengal. For the latter see Sebastian
Junger, War (London: Fourth Estate, 2010).
18
ANSO Quarterly Report 4 (2010), www.converge.org.nz/pma/nccdaf6.pdf; Gareth
Porter, “Deferring to Petraeus: National Intelligence Estimate Failed to Register Taliban
Growth,” CounterPunch, February 14, 2011; Carlotta Gall, “Midlevel Taliban Admit to a
Rift With Top Leaders,” The New York Times, February 21, 2011; personal
communication with ISAF officers, 2010.
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population of Afghanistan) has been rising in recent years. Among new
recruits, the percentage of non-Pashtuns has steadily risen at the expense
of Pashtuns, even if in absolute numbers more and more Pashtun recruits
have been forthcoming. Ethnic tensions within the Taliban have been
reported—Tajik commanders often seem to be among the moderates (but
not always), while Uzbeks tend to be among the radicals, for example19—
but these ethnic divisions do not necessarily coincide with different
political tendencies.
Discussion Questions

1.
Taliban recruitment increased from 2002–2010. What are
the primary drivers for recruitment? How ha the Afghan central
government and ISAF failed to reduce recruitment?
2.
Considering that the clergy play a fundamental role in
mobilizing the insurgents, what strategy, if any, could be implemented to
respond to that threat? What role does nostalgia play in the typical Afghan
view of the Taliban or mujahedeen?
3.
What strategic gaps exist that allow the Taliban to continue
exploiting foreign aid? Specifically, the implication that aid fuels conflict
in unequal, segmented tribal enclaves throughout Afghanistan?

D. The Strategic Balance
The strategic balance has been constantly shifting since 2001.
From a position of complete marginality in 2002, the insurgents managed
to reach a strategic stalemate, if not a slight advantage, by 2009. The
Afghan government in Kabul looked much more disunited than the
19
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insurgents themselves as the insurgents continued to make territorial gains
and expand their influence, including among ethnic minorities (i.e., nonPashtuns). (See Appendix E: The Afghan Government.) The number of
insurgents steadily grew. The reaction of the American government to a
perceived risk of failure in Afghanistan brought the dispatch of more
troops and the allocation of more resources to the Afghan theater. The
result was the consolidation of the stalemate, but also the introduction of
new elements of fluidity, which made predicting an outcome particularly
difficult.
By early 2011, it became evident that the Taliban were losing
ground for the first time in a number of areas, particularly Kunduz and
some parts of Helmand and Kandahar. They were still gaining ground in
other parts of the country, particularly in Nangarhar, and recovering
strength in western Afghanistan, where they had suffered badly in 2009.
The Taliban structure of command and control, which they had tried so
hard to develop, was suffering as a result of the massive increase in
Special Forces raids targeting commanders and leaders. At the same time,
the legitimacy of the Afghan government did not seem to be increasing,
nor was the popularity of foreign intervention.20

20
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III. The Taliban: Strategy and Operations
Until recently, a majority of observers doubted that the Taliban had
a strategy at all, arguing that they simply operated as a franchise of radical
groups that were intent on creating as much disruption as possible. Over
time, however, it has become increasingly clear that the Taliban does have
a strategy. A strategy might even have been in place in the early phases of
the insurgency (2002-05): the Pakistani Taliban were carrying out raids
alongside the border, attracting the attention of Operation Enduring
Freedom and drawing it away from the Taliban’s slow in-depth infiltration
of communities, leaving the inefficient and unpopular police as the only
force to try to contain them. Other signs of an overall strategy emerged
later, as the Taliban moved cadres from the provinces affected by the
fighting and sent them to areas of fresh expansion to train and encourage
inexperienced fighters. Geographic expansion has clearly been a priority
for the Taliban and they have reaped benefits from their investments,
bringing the conflict to new provinces every year.21
How the Taliban’s strategy has been developed is not clear. It is
known that debates have taken place within the leadership on specific
issues, and we also know that the leadership is constantly assisted by
Pakistani advisors, who very likely contribute to strategy development.
The allocation of human and material resources is also debated by the
leaders. For example, a debate occurred in 2007 concerning the
opportunity to send cadres into Farah province to exploit extremely weak
local governance and tribal connections between the Noorzais of
Kandahar, recently recruited to the Taliban cause, and the Noorzais of
Farah.22 Some Taliban leaders, notably the Haqqanis, argued that Farah
was not suitable to guerrilla war and that cadres there would be exposed.
Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop; Gilles Dorronsoro, The Taliban’s Winning
Strategy (Washington: The Carnegie Endowment, 2009).
22
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Those in favor of investing in Farah prevailed, however, and eastern and
central Farah turned into a hotbed of Taliban activity in 2007-08. In 2009,
an ISAF reaction led to the extermination of the local Taliban leadership
and heavy losses of cadres, vindicating the Haqqanis’ views. In general,
issues are debated by the leaders, with input by advisers, which in some
cases can be decisive if Pakistani interests are at stake. Decisions are taken
by consensus, or by majority if consensus is not achievable.23
There are clear indications that the strategy of the Taliban evolves
and adapts to the circumstances. The Taliban faced a backlash following
their rapid expansion in 2006-07, for example, as many communities that
they were entering strongly objected to their very conservative mores and
to the enforcement of Mullah Omar’s social edicts. These dated back to
when the Taliban regime was in power in the 1990s and included a ban on
music and on kite flying. After some discussion, Mullah Omar issued a
decree authorizing the field commanders to not implement his social
edicts, including the ban on music and orders to pray five times a day, if
they judged that the environment was not conducive to them. This is a
clear example of adaptation and strategic flexibility. In an apparent effort
to limit civilian casualties, the leadership later gradually started tightening
the rules on military engagement, another example of adaptation. This was
probably in response to debates on civilian casualties, both in the West
and in Afghanistan. Conversely, another example of Taliban strategic
adaptation was the decision to appoint radical commanders to keep the
level of violence high in 2010 in order to take advantage of ISAF’s
perceived lack of political will to remain in Afghanistan indefinitely.24
One of the most recent debates within the Taliban leadership
concerns the issue of negotiations with the Afghan government. The
debate appears to have been heated, with different positions confronting
each other. A majority vote within the leadership, presumably in early
23
24
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2010, saw the position sponsored by Mullah Omar prevail: negotiate only
from a position of strength after having defeated ISAF’s “surge.” It is still
unclear how the Taliban view negotiations—whether they are their
ultimate goal or only a tactic to get foreign armies out of the country.
There does seem to be genuine war-weariness building up within the
Taliban’s ranks among those commanders who have been on the scene for
a while and have witnessed the heavy casualty rate and those who have
developed personal issues with some of their colleagues. The problem
appears to be that negotiating reconciliation implies risks, both from the
Taliban who have assassination squads targeting the defectors as well as
from government officials who might have personal rivalries with the
reconciling Taliban.25

A. The Battle of Pashmul
The importance of operational planning in conflict is recorded in
the ability of operations to achieve their strategic goals. This brief vignette
focuses on this issue of interaction and operational cause and effect from
the Taliban’s perspective.
The Taliban reportedly conceived the Pashmul operation in 2005,
when it became known to them that Canadian troops would take over
responsibility for Kandahar province. Conceived by Mullah Dadullah, the
plan was to use Pashmul as the springboard for stepping up Taliban
operations in the province. It does not appear to have been in any sense a
detailed operational plan. Its grand lines featured intensifying activity in
order to inflict as many casualties as possible on the Canadians and then
seizing control of a section of Kandahar city, including a symbolic
building. The aim was to demoralize Canadian public opinion, cause panic
among Canadian politicians, and force a Canadian withdrawal, with large25
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scale political repercussions. The Taliban’s conviction that the Canadians
could not take Pashmul derived from their belief that it was unconquerable
and that even the Soviet army had not been able to take the area in the
1980s.26
Although it appears that the plan faced opposition within the
Taliban leadership, it was eventually approved and Dadullah was placed in
charge. The location was chosen because of its vineyards and ditches,
which offered cover to the Taliban. During the summer of 2006, an
unprecedented build-up of Taliban presence in the area of Pashmul started
taking place; bomb production workshops were established and
fortifications were built. The plan may actually have involved luring or
provoking the Canadians into attacking Pashmul, where terrain is more
difficult than in the rest of Kandahar, thus getting them to fight on a
ground of the Taliban’s choosing. As the buildup grew to hundreds and
perhaps over a thousand Taliban, attacks in and around Kandahar
intensified.27
The operation started rather successfully, with the Canadians
meeting heavy resistance and five Canadian forces quickly killed in
action. However, the belief that Pashmul’s vegetation and ditches would
provide cover from the air proved misplaced, as ISAF authorized
unguided bombing over the area despite the risk of collateral damage to
civilians. From that point onwards, the engagement was one-sided, with
the Taliban unable to inflict significant casualties on ISAF forces. ISAF
moved against Pashmul from Kandahar, and SOF intervened to cut off the
withdrawal route; the Taliban could not hold the ground under heavy
aerial bombardment and withdrew with heavy losses.
Tactically, the engagement was a Taliban defeat. However, the
very fact that the Taliban could engage ISAF in a conventional battle at
26

In reality, there is no indication that the Soviet army ever tried anything more then
battalion-size probing operations there.
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the outskirts of Kandahar had a major propaganda impact, demonstrating
their emergence as a major military force. It is not clear whether Pashmul
was actually meant to have a kind of “Tet offensive” impact or whether
that was simply achieved by chance and the operation was decided on the
basis of an unrealistic assessment of their own capabilities vis-à-vis the
Canadian troops. In either case, the Taliban effectively exploited the
situation and prioritized the return of their cadres in the area of Pashmul
after their tactical defeat, symbolizing their resilience and challenging
ISAF’s statement of a crushing victory. After Pashmul, the Taliban’s
influence in Kandahar province started growing steadily.
From the Taliban perspective, the Pashmul engagement was part of
a continuum of violence. Isolating it as a specific tactical event is therefore
arbitrary. What turned the engagement into a strategic success for the
Taliban was their willingness and ability to return to Pashmul within a few
months of the battle, demonstrating that they had not been crushed.28
However, the Taliban have not repeated operations like Pashmul after
2006, indicating that the cost in terms of casualties was assessed to be high
and that alternative ways of achieving similar psychological victories were
identified.

B. Operational Analysis
Few are the occasions when the Taliban tried to organize largescale operations, and few are the instances in which they carefully planned
small tactical operations (mostly in eastern Afghanistan). The battle of
Pashmul was an exception to standard Taliban operations. Operational
planning would normally take place within the scope of the team or front;
the commanders would confer with each other on how to organize an
attack or an ambush. Most fronts did not display much tactical
sophistication, although some has been evident in the east and more
28
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recently in parts of the south. Most ambushes and attacks therefore tended
to rely on a limited number of templates. The use of IEDs, for example, is
usually determined by the IED cell commander, who tells his men where
and when to place them. The limited reliance on operational planning
derives from the Taliban’s decentralized system of command, which
forces reliance on a limited number of basic templates that are easy to use
even by marginally skilled commanders.29
The lack of tactical sophistication is coherent with the Taliban’s
general military strategy, which could be described as the “war of the
flea.”30 The main tactical points are to convey an image of readiness to
sacrifice and resilience to the enemy, which is perceived as weakly
motivated (both ISAF/OEF and the Afghan security forces); the actual
tactical outcome of single engagements is less important. It is likely that
the Taliban developed their military strategy out of an assessment of their
tactical capabilities vis-à-vis NATO’s armies, rather than vice versa.
Another aspect of the Taliban’s improvement between tactics and
strategy has been their public relations campaign. It must be remembered
that the Taliban started off their insurgency in 2002 as an utterly defeated
and demoralized force. Their first priority was to challenge this image, and
they received substantial support from the Pakistani Taliban in achieving
this. Pashmul might be another example of an image-focused operation,
although it is not clear whether it was planned as such from the beginning.
As pointed out above, the gradual tightening of the rules of
engagement by the Taliban is very likely related to public relations
concerns. The development of the Taliban’s shadow governance system is
probably also connected to similar concerns. Until 2006-07 there was little
evidence that the Taliban were investing significant resources in it, but this
“Bigger, Badder IEDs…”; Jason Motlagh, “The Taliban's Changing, and Deadly,
Tactics,” Time Magazine, Jul. 01, 2010; Roy Gutman, “Afghanistan War: How Taliban
Tactics Are Evolving,” The Christian Science Monitor, March 15, 2010.
30
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changed as they acquired influence and control over more densely
populated areas of the country. Whether or not the Taliban initially
attributed much significance to their system of governors, clearly it was
becoming a serious enterprise by 2008. In early 2010 the Taliban decided
to appoint deputy governors at the district level, almost doubling the
number of political cadres dedicated to shadow government tasks. Even
the departments of education and health were reported to be active on the
Taliban side in some areas. And in some regions the judiciary was staffed
by real Taliban, as opposed to independent judges being sponsored by the
Taliban, as elsewhere.31
Much of the Taliban propaganda effort was aimed abroad, either to
the Afghan diaspora, which was wealthy enough to contribute to the
cause, or to sympathizers elsewhere in the Muslim world, mostly the Arab
Gulf countries. Inside Afghanistan, word of mouth and the activities of
political cadres remain the main vehicle of political propaganda; the
Taliban are also adept at exploiting the free market, with propaganda
DVDs selling well in the bazaars of southern Afghanistan and in
Pakistan.32
The Taliban seem, however, to have consistently opted for keeping
the technological level of their military effort low. For example, despite
the availability of Middle Eastern inputs that could have led to the
adoption of more advanced technologies, the Taliban have opted to
expand the use of IEDs quantitatively. Aware of the skills of their human
resource pool, they have created in some areas a veritable cottage industry
of IED production, a remarkable achievement in a cultural environment
where manual work is not the preferred form of militant engagement.
Similarly, the Taliban have been using more or less the same light
31
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weaponry since the beginning of the war, perhaps with an increase in the
use of recoilless guns in recent years and with the introduction of heavier
anti-aircraft guns (14.5mm as opposed to the 12.7mm almost exclusively
in use in the earlier years) and greater numbers of sniper rifles. Little effort
has been made to secure more advanced weaponry on the black market,
even when it was relatively easily available.33 These choices reflect a
recruiting base of men with limited skills, as well as the tendency of
commanders to view advanced and heavy weaponry as prestige weapons
that should not be used wastefully.34 IEDs, by contrast, were used more
effectively because nobody had an interest in treasuring them.
Much has been said about Taliban tactics being wasteful of the
lives of their fighters, although it has to be considered that many of the
casualties inflicted by ISAF were Taliban allies, such as mobilized
community youth, rather than core Taliban, particularly in southern
Afghanistan. As a result, it is easy to overestimate Taliban losses. Still, it
is clear that the Taliban have been willing to take heavy casualties in order
to contest the ground with ISAF and the Afghan security forces. Not doing
so would have hindered the Taliban’s objective to convey an image of
aggressiveness.
This attitude can be seen clearly in their efforts to bring the war to
Afghanistan’s cities. This effort has achieved some startling successes in
terms of high-profile attacks in the city center of Kabul, but it has cost the
Taliban and their Pakistani allies heavy casualties. The hit teams,
particularly the mixed Pakistani-Haqqani network ones, almost invariably
got wiped out, even in the event of success.35
Personal communication with ISAF officers, 2009-10; Matt Dupee, “The Taliban
Acquisition of Anti-Aircraft Platforms,” The Long War Journal, November 2, 2010; Ben
Gilbert, “Afghanistan's ‘Hurt Locker’: Facing Off with IEDs,” Minnpost, 10 February
2010.
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A key aspect of Taliban risk management is maintaining their
sanctuaries in Pakistan. For example, the leadership has come under
pressure from the Pakistani army to convince the Tehrik-I Taliban
Pakistan (Movement of the Pakistani Taliban, or TTP) to abandon its
stance against the Pakistani authorities; having failed that, the Taliban had
to reluctantly distance themselves from the TTP, although they do not
appear to have severed every contact.36 They have so far avoided openly
declaring their rejection of the TTP, despite Pakistani insistence. In order
to secure their sanctuaries, the Taliban cannot object too strongly to
Pakistani directives, but at the same time they are reluctant to sever any
link to the TTP, which according to some sources controls important
Taliban weapon depots. Resentment against the Pakistani army and what
the Taliban considers the army’s exploitative and opportunistic attitude
towards them is widespread within the Taliban; the leadership, however,
cannot afford to let this have repercussions. They tend to use soft tactics to
resist Pakistani pressure, such as postponement and delay. In 2010, for
example, faced with Pakistani pressure to agree with the Pakistani peace
plan for Afghanistan, the Taliban raised issues of insufficient
representation within the future coalition government. For the Taliban, the
political risk deriving from a direct clash with the Pakistanis overrides any
other consideration.37 (See Appendix F: Regional Powers and U.S./Allies.)

Discussion Questions

1.
What does the Taliban do to ensure that their efforts remain
successful in militarized zones despite centralized leadership?
2.
Have the Taliban implemented a cohesive strategy since
2001? Who and what has been the primary driver of their strategy?
37
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3.
Pakistan continues to have a significant impact on the
conflict in Afghanistan. Are there seams and gaps that can be exploited to
diminish this influence?
4.
What mitigating factors drive cooperation and partnership
between the Taliban and other groups? How can these be exploited by
ISAF?
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IV. ISAF/OEF Strategy and Taliban Adaptation
Having underestimated the spread of the insurgency until at least
2006, ISAF/OEF has struggled to develop a coherent counterinsurgent
strategy. Different ISAF commanders have shifted the focus back and
forth, sometimes placing it on close air support, sometimes on clean-up
operations. This has been particularly problematic because they typically
lacked the human resources to hold territories wrested from the enemy.
The pace of formation of the Afghan security forces was increased
gradually after 2005, but the basic structure and orientation of training
remained the same. The army in particular was being trained as light
infantry, mostly designed for clean-up operations. Despite their numerical
growth, army and police still appeared rather ineffective at holding
territory during 2010, particularly when not combined with a strong ISAF
contingent.38
Beginning in 2006, ISAF started experimenting with solutions to
the problem of holding territory, mostly focusing on irregular militias or
paramilitary forces to be based in the villages. These have run the gamut
from Auxiliary Police to Afghan Public Protection Force to Afghan Local
Police. Each iteration brought its own challenges, particularly on the issue
of how the militia force could be integrated into the Afghan security
apparatus. The idea was to tap into the same reservoir of conflict and
rivalry among communities that the Taliban were exploiting. However, the
problem turned out to be how to exercise a sufficient degree of command
and control over these forces, and the Ministry of Interior repeatedly failed
to live up to its task of supervising the militias.39
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As a result, throughout 2002-10, the focus of ISAF’s effort has
been luring the Taliban into a war of attrition, in which the overwhelming
tactical superiority of American and NATO infantries coupled with close
air support would eventually wear them down and cause them to crack.
This was achieved by dispatching small patrols and building seemingly
isolated outposts in enemy territory. Although the enemy reacted with
repeated attacks and took high casualties, by 2007 it was clear that the
Taliban was not wearing down but instead growing stronger. At this point,
ISAF started targeting enemy commanders for killing, and from 2010,
capture, through night raids. Although it did not reduce the Taliban’s
numbers, this tactic seems to have achieved greater success in weakening
the ability of the enemy to fight, since young replacement commanders did
not usually have the same skills as their predecessors.40
One of the reasons why the Taliban were not weakened by ISAF
tactics until at least 2010 is their tactical adaptation and evolution. As the
leadership observed the heavy casualties and minimal impact of their
original attacks on patrols and outposts, it started pushing for the adoption
of asymmetric tactics. An internal debate on the merits of the new tactics
appears to have gone on for some time. A decision to implement them
clearly took place in 2007, but it took several years for this to be adopted
across the provinces, as many commanders resisted. It appears that the
Taliban even had to create a parallel structure specializing in IEDs in
response to the reluctance of existing commanders to integrate the IEDs in
their operations.41 It is important to point out that the conditions of
Scott Baldauf, “Small US Units Lure Taliban into Losing Battles,” The Christian
Science Monitor, October 31, 2005; personal communications with diplomats and ISAF
officers, 2008-9; Andy Bloxham, “Afghan War Logs: The Secret Special Forces Hit
Squads Hunting Taliban Leaders,” The Telegraph, 26 Jul 2010; Thomas Harding,
“Quarter of Senior Taliban killed by SAS in 'Kill or Capture' Targeting,” The Telegraph,
1 September 2010; Nick Davies, “Afghanistan War Logs: Task Force 373 – Special
Forces Hunting Top Taliban,” The Guardian, 25 July 2010.
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utilization of IEDs in the post-2001 conflict differed markedly from the
utilization of mines in the 1980s. In the 1980s, mines were ready-made in
Western, Chinese, and other factories, while after 2001 the Taliban had to
manufacture IEDs themselves. In the 1980s, the Soviets and their allies
were not able to survey the roads and retaliate against the insurgents
laying mines, while after 2001 drone surveillance became a major concern
for the IED-laying teams. ISAF anti-IED technology was also much more
sophisticated than the Soviet one.
ISAF’s targeted killing had an impact from 2007 on Taliban
operations; its gradual escalation in 2007-09, however, once again allowed
the Taliban to adapt by further decentralizing their command and control,
particularly in southern Afghanistan where most targeted killing was
concentrated. After the targeting of Taliban commanders intensified
greatly in 2010, the Taliban did face difficulties in adapting, particularly
because of the sudden character of the escalation. Although the
decentralized character of Taliban operations helped them replace
commanders easily, their shadow governance structure, which they had
been steadily developing since 2006, were badly damaged by the
targeting; replacing shadow governors proved much more difficult than
replacing military commanders.
The role of external support in fostering Taliban adaptation is
unclear, but there are reports that the Pakistanis increased their financial
support in 2010. And although some IED advisers from Iraq were reported
to be training Taliban cadres in Pakistan in 2009, the design and evolution
of IEDs appears to mostly occur locally.42
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Until 2009, ISAF/OEF’s almost exclusive preoccupation has been
with “kinetic” effects, a legacy of many years of conventional training. As
a result, operational analysis prior to 2009 was mainly focused on how to
improve tactics and minimize casualties, such as by feeding information to
the US Department of Defense and the industry for the development of
better armored vehicles. Information gathering, even of the “atmospheric”
type, was almost non-existent until 2006 and then developed only slowly
until 2009. Arguably, only the dramatic sacking of ISAF’s commander
Gen. McKiernan in 2009 prompted it into a serious analytical
reconsideration of ISAF tactics and strategies in Afghanistan. Several
reviews, mostly ordered by Washington, took place, highlighting
weaknesses and failures. This eventually led to a revised targeting policy,
with greater emphasis on capturing enemy commanders alive as a source
of information, and to a tightening of the rules of engagement in order to
avoid civilian casualties. The practice of using patrols and isolated
outposts as bait for the insurgents was gradually abandoned and appears to
have outlived its usefulness.43
The changes brought about by Gen. McChrystal in 2009 were
more clearly based on an analysis of the Afghan environment than his
predecessors’ changes had been; his successor, Gen. Petraeus, made
further changes, somewhat loosening the rules of engagement and
investing additional resources in the targeting of enemy commanders,
particularly shadow governors. ISAF’s operational design may have been
sound in purely military terms at this point, but its flaw remained a weak
or nonexistent integration with the political dimensions of the conflict.
The Helmand and Kandahar 2010 operations, for example, were
implemented with the awareness that the government’s administration and
police forces were not in a position to fill any gap created by ISAF in the
enemy’s presence on the ground. Nor did the military strategy seem to
Woodward, Obama’s Wars; Hastings, “King David’s War”; personal communications
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factor in the Afghan political leadership’s growing unease with
Washington and its plans. The threat represented to the viability of Afghan
army and police by political factionalism is similarly being conveniently
ignored, although this arguably could represent a greater threat to the
stability of Afghanistan than the insurgency per se.44
Discussion Questions

1.
Considering that ISAF and its allies are vyying for
legitimacy in the eyes of the population, what advantages and
opportunities can we exploit, relative to the insurgents’ culnerabilities, to
encourage strategic, operational, and tactical success?
2.
How and why did post-2007 Taliban forces grow stronger
from an increase in the use of close air support and the build-up of combat
outposts? Other than IEDs, what asymmetrical strategies were employed
by the Taliban?

A. Operation Mushtarak
A good example of ISAF’s new and improved operational
planning is Operation Mushtarak, which began in February 2010. The
operation included a lengthy planning process and was in many ways the
most ambitious operation planned by ISAF up to that point. Mushtarak
was considered by ISAF and by many external observers as a major
improvement on previous efforts, in particular because of the extensive
preparations made both for the operation and for holding the ground
afterwards. In order to establish a government presence as soon as possible
in the area targeted by the operation (the town of Marja in Nad-i Ali
district), efforts were made to recruit experienced government
administrators for the task, albeit with limited results. Mobile police units
44
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(ANCOP), better trained than the standard Uniformed Police, were
deployed to hold territory after the cleaning phase was over, although even
in this case they performed below expectations. Information gathering
before the operation was extensive, with the result that that ISAF was
better informed about the area and the Taliban operating there than on
previous occasions. It seems to have missed the presence of an
underground network of Taliban, however, which harassed ISAF troops
for several months after the successful roll out, even in the little town of
Marja itself. 45

B. ISAF and Its Adaptation After 2009
From 2002-09, ISAF gave the impression of being more concerned
with the safety of its own soldiers than with the achievement of strategic
military and political goals or with the safety of Afghan civilians. The
accusations in this regard might be unfair (on a historical scale, ISAF is
probably one of the best behaved occupation forces ever) but must be seen
as part of the operating environment. The effort to impose tighter and
tighter rules of engagement has been going in the direction of factoring in
these types of concerns, but the intermediate and lower levels of command
within ISAF have not been fully cooperative in this effort. Resentment
among junior officers for what they felt were excessively tight rules of
engagement probably contributed to Gen. Petraeus’s decision to relax
them somewhat when he took over in 2010.46
Post-2009, ISAF/OEF’s operational planning was much more
sophisticated and professional than the Taliban’s; almost invariably, this
resulted in ISAF/OEF’s forces emerging victorious from engagements.
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Even in those instances where unexpected Taliban resistance was met, the
post-2009 version of ISAF/OEF had the ability to rapidly adapt their
operations to the new challenge, as in the case of Pashmul discussed
above. This was due to their sophisticated command and control structure,
even if the multitude of daily tactical situations made it easier to exercise
command in serious engagements than control in all circumstances.47
In contrast to the Taliban, ISAF/OEF have been consistently well
resourced, especially since 2009. ISAF was deploying 32,000 to 33,000
combat troops by the end of 2010, which together with about 70,000
Afghan soldiers and 60,000 police in the field were facing a maximum of
40,000 full-time insurgents. This is far from the 10:1 superiority
recommended by counterinsurgency textbooks to achieve a decisive
numerical advantage. Such superiority is probably unachievable, however:
ISAF’s troop commitments are only likely to decline in the future, and the
attrition rates of the Afghan forces (32 percent for the army and 23 percent
for the police as of February 2011) will prevent those forces from growing
indefinitely. The NATO Training Mission started talking in 2010 about
forming a new leadership for the Afghan security forces, but they did not
have a viable plan to achieve that quickly enough as of 2011.48
Only since 2009 has ISAF/OEF demonstrated an ability to adapt to
the challenges posed by the insurgency. The weaknesses of the Taliban
have been known for a long time; monitoring Taliban communications
47
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highlighted their crisis of growth in 2007 as well as the crisis of discipline
in late 2008, when the Taliban could not effectively control the mass of
new recruits flocking to the movement, particularly in Kabul’s region. But
whether ISAF really acquired an ability to seize any opportunity offered
by weaknesses shown by their enemy in 2010-11 is not clear. Tactically,
ISAF certainly acquired greater flexibility with the arrival of a large SOF
contingent in 2010 and has been pursuing the Taliban relentlessly in a
number of provinces. The expanding SOF contingent allowed ISAF to
bring the war to the Taliban’s turf in the mountains and therefore wrest the
initiative away from them.
Strategically, ISAF’s military focus remained a problem. The need
of a political approach to the insurgency was still generally understood as
offering some form of reintegration path to surrendering Taliban. The
continued reliance on foreign troops to bring pressure on the insurgents
has had significant costs in terms of public relations, particularly inside
Afghanistan, and has made an improvement in the perception of foreign
troops and of their role difficult to achieve.49

C. Taliban in Kunduz 2006–2010
One way to illustrate these trends of interaction, adaptation, and
reassessment is to focus on a particular example. The Taliban in Kunduz
from 2006-2010 provides just such a strategic and operational overview,
with the added benefit of an operationally and strategically successful
ending. This vignette suggests two important lessons in countering
interaction and adaptation: disruption operations and counternetwork
operations can have operational and strategic effects; and, when the
pressure was off the Taliban in this region, they lost their adaptive
capabilities and their skills eroded over time.
Hastings, “King David’s War”; David Isby, Afghanistan: Graveyard of Empires (New
York: Pegasus Books, 2010): 291.
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The appearance of the Taliban in Kunduz was the result of long
and determined efforts that started in 2006 with the dispatch of political
agents tasked to contact locals and particularly former members of the
movement and convince them to join the insurgency. These efforts were
not successful initially, but by 2008 their persistence was beginning to pay
off, and the Taliban managed to mobilize a new generation of young
fighters. A veritable mass mobilization occurred in 2009 within some
Pashtun communities of the province, particularly in Chardara district.
Riding this wave of popular support, the Taliban managed to bring the war
to almost every corner of this multi-ethnic province, invading Tajik,
Uzbek and Turkmen areas. Although the Taliban could recruit a few Tajik
commanders on their side, by and large the Taliban of Kunduz remained a
Pashtun movement. Their encroachment on non-Pashtun territory brought
about a reaction by what was left of the old militias of Jamiat-i Islami,
Junbesh-i Milli-ye Islami, and other groups, which remobilized to push the
Taliban back. The situation had stabilized by early 2010, with the Taliban
in control of most Pashtun villages and the militias in control of most of
the Tajik, Uzbek, and Turkmen villages.
The Taliban’s luck, however, was about to run out. US SOF
entered the scene during the summer and autumn of 2010, hitting the local
Taliban very hard and virtually exterminating their local leadership. The
Taliban in Kunduz had not been under heavy pressure before, since the
local ISAF-German garrison had not been proactive in fighting them and
the Afghan police was also ineffective. This sudden escalation not only
decapitated the network locally but also threw the Taliban itself into
disarray. They had become used to dictating the pace and timing of
conflict in the region; the speed and ferocity of the SOF attacks disrupted
this cozy situation.
The Taliban’s strategic and operational decision making process is
not particularly fast, not least because decisions are usually taken after
debates and require consensus. Up until this point, however, they had
46
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certainly seemed to have been faster in taking decisions than Kabul, ISAF,
or Washington (or to be more precise, the combination of them). The
Taliban’s decision making and lengthy processes of implementation has
been highlighted as a particular weakness. This was not a problem until
2009, when ISAF became more proactive and the Taliban struggled to
keep up with the pace. Unable to adapt quickly in Kunduz, the Taliban
started losing ground, and even the Afghan police was able to regain the
initiative against them. With the exception of some of the better trained,
more radical Taliban groups, supported by foreign elements, who tried to
fight back, the bulk of the Taliban had surrendered or fled Kunduz by
February 2011.50
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V. Conclusion
Insurgencies are dynamic processes of adaptation and
counteradaptation. There should always be an expectation that insurgents
will try to adapt to whatever counterinsurgency effort is mobilized against
them; while demanding a major investment of energy and resources,
adaptation might actually ending up making the insurgents stronger. Any
counterinsurgency effort should therefore be based on an assessment of
the insurgents’ capabilities and potential. The counterinsurgent should be
careful about not pushing the insurgency down a road that, although
difficult to pursue, might turn it into a superior organization. As of 2011,
the indications were that the growing pressure exercised on the Taliban
might be achieving exactly that, while the Kabul government forces,
sheltered by a massive international presence, failed to keep the pace.
Tactical encounters in a guerrilla war do not have the same
significance as they have in a conventional conflict: they are not primarily
meant to defeat the enemy militarily or achieve strict military aims. What
the insurgents try to achieve by challenging the enemy militarily is to
show that the monopoly of violence has been broken and that there is
competition over who is the legitimate government of the country.
Tactical encounters, therefore, have a symbolic significance, particularly
when the enemy is widely perceived as being far superior in terms of
resources and technology, which is certainly the case in Afghanistan.
Therefore, indulging in the celebration of tactical successes, while useful
to boost the morale of the conventional army facing the insurgency, is
misleading in terms of analyzing the dynamics of the conflict. The
thinking has to be in terms of the impact on local perceptions: whom the
villagers see as the dominant force locally. Tactical encounters are only
the tip of an iceberg of activities that include armed propaganda,
intimidation, coercion, population control, and administration, which
military intelligence agencies often fail to detect or detect belatedly.
48
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Discussion Questions

1.
What factors contribute to the success or failure of armed
groups in general?
2.
What distinctive or unique approaches have the Taliban
implemented to make their legacy successful?
3.
The Taliban’s strong point of decentralization is also a
weakness. Apart from targeted killings, how can ISAF and its allies
exploit that weakness?
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VI. Annexes
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Annex A: Historical Context
Politically, Afghanistan was largely stable in the 1970s before the
1978 Communist coup, although not completely calm. Some small
Maoist-leaning groups challenged government control in the Shamali
region and other areas just north of Kabul but did not pose a serious threat.
The Maoists recruited educated and semi-educated people who were often
discriminated against within the government, especially Hazaras and
Shiites. The pro-Soviet leftists were strong in the army and in the state
bureaucracy, but weak in the villages. They did recruit many teachers,
however, gaining some influence among the rural population. The
Islamists recruited among the upper middle class for the sympathies of the
urban population, sometimes in competition with pro-Soviet leftists, but
had greater success in attracting young men of rural origins who were
disturbed by the relative progressiveness of cities like Kabul and
Jalalabad, where the universities were based. They tried to organize an
uprising in select rural areas in 1975 but failed miserably. By 1978 they
were a marginal force, with perhaps one thousand or so activists, most of
whom were in exile in Pakistan.51
The Muslim clergy, who would play a very important role in the
jihad movement, were quiet and fragmented in many local networks,
without a real national leadership or an ability to mobilize nationally.
Tribes and communities were also quiet and no local revolts were
recorded during the 1970s, as the central state had convincingly
demonstrated its willingness to repress any revolt ruthlessly.52
A. Giustozzi, “Transition Without End,” working paper (London: Crisis States
Research Centre, 2009); A. Guistozzi Empires of Mud (London: Hurst, 2009); Richard H.
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University Press, 2006): Chapter 6.
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The Communist government that seized power in 1978 ignited the
conflict by antagonizing the more conservative strata of the population as
well as the new Islamist-leaning Pakistani regime of Gen. Zia-ul Haq.53
The leftists launched land reform and a series of progressive initiatives
concerning female emancipation, which created turmoil and some violent
resistance. The regime reacted indiscriminately and set out to wipe out the
top layers of the clergy and tribal aristocracy, believing that they had a
hand in organizing the resistance. The armed forces often reacted brutally
to attacks on party activists and state officials, bombing villages.
Rather than weakening the opposition, this indiscriminate
overreaction energized it. Many thought that the regime was out to
exterminate all perceived opposition, and Afghans felt driven to fight out
of fear of being caught in the repression. The Soviet intervention at the
end of 1979 was meant to stabilize the new regime, reorganize the security
forces, and leave as quickly as possible. Instead, the regeneration of the
Afghan armed forces proved a more complicated task than they had
expected, as Soviet presence in the country aroused even further
opposition and the Soviets were caught in the conflict.54
The Mujahideen “Way of War” in the 1980s
In 1978-80, it was common to observe Afghan Pashtun
communities mobilize tribal lashkars (tribal armies) and move against
government compounds with frontal, ill-organized attacks. The
appearance of Soviet air power and relatively well-directed artillery fire
made this tactic suicidal and triggered the evolution of the resistance.
Although the lashkars allowed tribal leadership to maintain control over
53
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the mass of the tribesmen, they were unsuitable against the Soviets. This
failure paved the way for guerrilla war, which undermined tribal
leadership’s ability to maintain control, as the tribal elders had little
relevant experience in this field and little understanding of the need for
tactical adaptation, such as small unit tactics, underground work, and so
forth.
At the start of the conflict, the jihadist opposition—calling itself
the mujahideen or holy warriors—was decentralized and disorganized.
Most of the armed groups were formed locally and mobilized by local
communities, landlords, and strongmen. Organized Islamist input was
marginal. After the intervention of the Soviet army, the mujahideen began
adapting to new circumstances and a more challenging environment. This
was facilitated by the desertion to the resistance of a number of Afghan
army officers and the provision of training by the Pakistani army. 55
All of these issues played in favor of the emergence of a new class
of military professionals. The mujahideen originally came from social
groups who had experience in either military tactics or underground work:
former military personnel, political activists, and bandits. Over time, the
most apt of these young men and boys who had joined the fight in 19781980 rose up the ranks of the opposition and attained leadership positions.
This new social group gradually became a new social class, one with little
memory of pre-war ways of life and a high awareness of their own
importance. The original leadership, rooted in the roles they played as
civilians before the outbreak of the conflict, was marginalized in most of
the country.56
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In terms of tactical evolution, the mujahideen developed or refined
guerrilla tactics and shaped their organization around their commanders.57
From the squad leader to the front commander, the commanders became
the core structure of virtually all the resistance groups and parties. At the
local level, organizations became dependent on charismatic leaders who
built armed groups around themselves and maintained full control over
them. Little organizational development took place beyond this. The main
exception was Hizb-i Islami, the main Islamist organization in the conflict,
which tried to develop a sophisticated structure of centralized control. It
established a UHF radio network, employed a kind of political commissar,
and created a relatively complex bureaucracy in Pakistan to oversee the
whole effort.58 But even Hizb-i Islami struggled to implement its own
strategy of creating a centralized insurgency, mainly due to the shortage of
educated cadres.59 In the absence of a political structure to support the
resistance, the commanders started turning into “new khans,” assuming
the role of local strongmen and prioritizing local concerns and interests at
the expense of any national strategy or aims.60
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The initial Soviet units that moved into Afghanistan at the end of
1979 were constituted of reserve forces mobilized in the Turkestan
military region. These were some of the weakest units of the whole Soviet
army, and their capabilities in terms of counterguerrilla operations were
very limited. Starting in 1980, however, the Soviet army replaced the
Central Asian reservists with better trained conscripts and an increasing
number of Special Forces (Spetsnaz). Close air support improved with the
deployment of growing numbers of Mi-24 Hind helicopter gunships,
which were also assigned to the Afghan air force in substantial numbers,
and Su-25 Frogfoot close air support aircraft, which proved effective and
were even used to deliver laser-guided bombs.61
More important than the military dimension of the Soviet-Afghan
counterinsurgency, however, was the political-intelligence dimension. The
KGB rebuilt Afghan intelligence from scratch and allowed it to take
control of most of the counterinsurgency effort. The main features of this
effort included a larger and larger special force command under the
Afghan Intelligence Service (Khadamat-i Atala’at-i Dawlati, or KhAD)
that eventually relied on 60 battalions, thousands of political agents
around the country, and the creation of a large militia force. The purpose
of these units was to bring the war to the villages, the home turf of the
insurgents, and to identify divisions and weaknesses within the ranks of
the opposition.
The evolution of the Soviet-Afghan effort increased pressure on
the insurgents; although the Spetsnaz were never able to completely close
the supply lines coming from Pakistan, they were able to assist in partially
choking off supplies to northern Afghanistan. This was the first region of
Afghanistan where the pro-Soviet government began to gain the upper
hand in 1985. The militias helped to marginalize the mujahideen in the
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north and later also in the west. KhAD political agents succeeded in
reducing the level of opposition in Kandahar as well as some other areas.62
The mujahideen struggled to adapt to this combination of military
and political tactics; many chose instead to come to terms with the
government and sign ceasefires or switch sides. A minority of mujahideen,
however, did adapt, often driven by ideology, and that was enough to
maintain a degree of threat even in the areas where the pro-Soviet
government was strongest. Militarily, the mujahideen increasingly relied
on Western manufactured and undetectable mines, anti-tank weaponry
(eventually including guided missiles), long-range rockets and mortars,
and anti-aircraft weaponry to counterbalance the technological escalation
taking place on the government side. Tactical skills also evolved, mostly
in specific areas and under specific commanders. Some commanders grew
into regional commanders, able to coordinate operations on a large scale;
their ability to mobilize junior commanders was always limited, even
where the process went further, such as around Panjshir (Commander
Ahmad Shah Massud) and around Herat (Commander Ismail Khan).63
The final collapse of the pro-Soviet regime was not the result of a
mujahideen victory, but of the collapse of the regime’s source of
patronage, the Soviet Union. Fragments of the regime’s militias and
different factions of the mujahideen then confronted each other in a civil
war that began in 1992 with occasional flareups of fighting and quickly
degenerated into full-scale conflict. This phase consisted of a civil war
among factions of similar strength, so we shall not examine it in detail.
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What was going on was semi-regular militias, initially with the
incorporation of some units of what had been the regular army of the proSoviet regime, confronting each other over the control of roads and urban
centers.
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Annex B: Afghanistan’s Economic Environment
The assumption that simply pumping resources into a post-conflict
country helps address problems quickly has been proven wrong,
particularly in Afghanistan. The roots of this problem were created during
the Soviet-Afghan conflict and have been exacerbated by more than 30
years of conflict. The bubble economy created after 2001 is important
because it divided the country between the beneficiaries of the new
setup—relatively few—and a majority who lost out because a massive
inflationary process eroded their purchasing power. It also insulated the
Afghan government from its natural constituency, the Afghan population.
Prior to the Soviet-Afghan war, Afghanistan’s economy was very
underdeveloped. State control discouraged private initiative and little
financial accumulation occurred; the banking system was also state
controlled. The government was dependent on external assistance for its
development efforts, which primarily consisted of infrastructure extension
as well as a few extractive and industrial projects; these were mostly run
inefficiently and did not contribute significantly to state revenue. The state
had gradually abandoned direct taxation after World War II, relying
instead on custom revenues. This had a greater degree of cost
effectiveness but also insulated the state from society, making it more
resilient to turmoil and less responsive than ever to demands coming from
society. This tendency was reinforced by the impact of external assistance,
mostly of Soviet origin, with American help a close second.64
From 1978 onwards, Afghanistan’s economy was transformed in a
number of ways. A war economy developed in which the government was
completely dependent on Soviet hand-outs and the opposition depended
on American and Arab support; smuggling networks developed rapidly
during the 1980s and by the 1990s were ready to provide sources of
64
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revenue to factions in a civil war that regional powers and superpowers
had little or no interest in supporting financially. Even the Saudis,
Pakistanis, and Iranians, who kept supporting their Afghan allies in the
1990s, were nowhere as lavish in their support as they had been in the
1980s. 65
The Taliban similarly received some support from abroad, but
mostly relied on revenue they could raise through taxation and customs.
By de facto legalizing the smuggling networks and taxing them, they
raised sufficient revenue to run their own state administration, admittedly
on the cheap.66
From 2001 onwards the situation again resembled that of the
1980s, with external aid and expenditure overshadowing anything else,
except perhaps a booming narcotics trade. The bubbles created by aid
money and direct expenditures of foreign armies and civilian agencies
drove massive economic growth, with the building and contracting
industries in particular growing multifold. Afghanistan’s industrial sector
and agriculture lagged behind; the high costs of labor and energy made it
difficult for Afghan entrepreneurs to sell locally manufactured products
competitively.
The insulation of the government from society was consolidated by
a level of external financial inflows that far exceeded previous levels in
real terms; however, the effects of these high levels of expenditure
percolated down to society in a number of ways. First, employment was
created, at least in the cities, drawing villagers away from the countryside;
the rising cost of living also provided an incentive to either find salaried
employment or rely on cash crops such as poppies. Although corruption
was already in expansion in the 1990s, the new wealth further stimulated
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the corruption of government officials, whose salaries were no longer
sufficient to afford a decent lower-middle-class standard of living.
Perhaps the most significant impact was the changing mentality of
the upper strata of the rural population. Those with resources were now
less interested in redistribution and in developing a retinue of followers
than in investing in profitable ventures, where returns were often
exceptionally high, particularly for those well-connected to the Afghan
government or foreign agencies. In a sense, capitalism arrived in
Afghanistan for the first time, with a deep transformative impact that, in
the short term, undermined a system of government based on the influence
of elders and on some residual ability of communities to administer
themselves.67

Discussion Questions

1.
How could the Afghan government compete with the
heavy-handed Taliban for tax revenue?
2.
What provisions could the Afghan central bank make to
inhibit the Taliban from collecting taxes from communities?

A. Giustozzi, “The Political Economy of International Post-Conflict Statebuilding in
Afghanistan,” in The Political Economy of Post-Conflict Statebuilding: Power after
Peace, Edited by Mats Berdal and Dominik Zaum, (forthcoming 2011).
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Annex C: Afghanistan—A Fragmented Society
The impact of external support on a society fragmented to start
with and further fragmented by more than 20 years of war has been to
excite rivalries and jealousies. The urban/rural divide and the role of the
clergy are essential to understanding mobilization on the insurgents’ side.
A fragmented society with only limited experience of successful statebuilding in the past is particularly difficult to handle for any outside actors
intervening in support of whichever elite is currently claiming to be the
Afghan government.
Afghanistan has always been very fragmented socially due to the
coexistence within its boundaries of many different communities, the
weak central state, and the limited economic development that never
managed to merge the communities into a national whole. There are an
estimated 400 Pashtun tribes, each further sub-divided into rival
communities and clans, and thousands of non-Pashtun communities, often
distinct unto themselves. To the extent that economic and social
development has taken place, it only had an impact in terms of merging
communities in the cities, and even that was negatively affected by 30
years of internal conflict and the breakdown of the state in the 1990s. In
these early stages of economic and social development, the impact has
been to further complicate Afghanistan’s fragmentation by creating social
interest groups that intertwine with communities, ethnic groups, and tribes
rather than combine them.68
Even a simplified picture of Afghan society shows that
communities vary greatly in terms of their internal organization. In the
southeast and in remote areas of the south and east, tribes have maintained
their functionality, have leadership capable of mobilizing the community
for collective action, and are quite autonomous from the Afghan state.
68
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Around the main cities and highways of the south and east, however,
tribes have lost this ability and often maintain little more than a residual
form of identity that some politicians try to tap into for political
mobilization through the distribution of favors and patronage. In such
areas, any collective action happens at the sub-tribal level, typically in
communities of villages relatively isolated from other components of
Afghan society.
Similarly, non-Pashtun communities tend to have a capacity for
collective action when they are remote from the cities, but this can be
implemented through different systems of self-organization. In some cases
(Badakhshan, Hazarajat, Uzbek communities of northern Afghanistan),
mobilization is achieved through a strongman who has the physical force
and the resources to mobilize a retinue of armed men; this mobilization
typically is not as inclusive as in Pashtun tribes.
In other cases, a collective leadership of elders can mobilize the
youth (Tajik areas north of Kabul). Often the system is mixed: the elders
have a say but only a strongman can effectively mobilize people. In part,
these social structures existed before the war; however, 30 years of war
have created a new class of “military leaders” or strongmen who in the
presence of a weak state have been able to assume control of many
communities or have gained a strong bargaining position vis-à-vis the
elders.69 According to the Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG)
database, maintained by Afghanistan New Beginning Program (ANBP)
and the Disarmament Commission, there were 5,557 illegal armed groups
as of late 2006.70 The number might actually be higher now due to
widespread insecurity. Strongmen with an armed retinue thus are a feature
of the Afghan social landscape that is not going to disappear soon.
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The urbanization of Afghanistan has further complicated this
picture. All the main Afghan cities (Kabul, Herat, Mazar-I Sharif,
Kandahar, and Jalalabad) have, to various degrees, been swollen by a
wave of migrants from the villages as well as recent immigrants, mostly
refugees from Pakistan and Iran. This wave has diluted the urban character
of the cities, which had already been weakened during the war by
successive waves of emigration of middle- and upper-class citizens.
Generally speaking, the urban population is demoralized and not very
active politically; they feel betrayed by the government but rarely have
sympathy for the armed opposition. Heavily rigged elections have kept
almost all of the urban intelligentsia out of parliament.
Finally, the importance of the Islamic clergy in Afghanistan cannot
be underestimated. At the start of the 30 years of conflict, it was estimated
that clerics and other religious figures (saints, holy figures, etc.) comprised
about 2 percent of the population. That percentage is likely to have grown
because of increased recruitment to religious schools in the 1980s, when
the state educational system was pushed out of the villages and Arab
countries funded a massive expansion of religious education for Afghans
in Pakistan. Typically, the Afghan clergy has always been fragmented in
small local networks, with just the mystic Sufi orders (Naqshandiyya,
Qadiriyya, and Chestiyya) being organized in wider (but never truly
national) networks. The emergence of clerical resistance parties in the
1980s (such as Harakat-e Enqelab among the Sunnis) helped unify various
small clerical networks into a wider organization. The next crucial passage
in the emergence of the clergy as a “social class” with strong political
ambitions was the Taliban government of 1996-2001, which exerted a
great effort to mobilize clerical networks countrywide to support the new
government and represent it at the local level. The Taliban obtained a fair
degree of success; however, not all clerical networks were responsive. In
particular, Sufis tended not to link with the Taliban. The experience of
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power and influence of the clergy in this period explain the later nostalgia
for the Taliban among many mullahs.71

Discussion Questions

1.
Urbanized Afghans are typically the most educated and
prosperous in Afghanistan. They are also the least active in the
government, the military, and the insurgency. How has ISAF and the U.S.
marginalized this group since 2001? What can be done to gain their
support?
2.
What role has patrimolialism played in governance? Is this
form of rule justified, consdering the historical clan/tribe system of
governance?
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Annex D: Other Insurgent and Pro-Government Groups
A. Insurgent Armed Groups
Hizb-i Islami is the second-largest insurgent group in Afghanistan,
accounting for perhaps 10 percent of the strength of the insurgency. Many
former fighters of Hizb-i Islami or their relatives also fight in the ranks of
the Taliban, particularly in areas where Hizb-i Islami has no organized
presence. It operates mostly in eastern Afghanistan, reaching out to some
areas around Kabul and the southeast. Hizb-i Islami’s relations with the
Taliban are often troubled, and the two groups have fought each other in
the recent past; as of early 2011 they seem to have patched up their
differences and are fighting together again.72 Hizb-i Islami’s strategy
appears easier to analyze than the Taliban’s. It does not have the financial
resources to compete with the Taliban for the leadership of the insurgency,
and its aim has been to enhance its military strength gradually in order to
gain leverage at the negotiating table once time is ripe for an agreement.
Hizb-i Islami could not afford to negotiate separately, because the
Pakistanis oppose such a move and because the Taliban would not have
much leverage in such a case. Hizb-I Islami does not want a military
victory for the Taliban. Ideally, the party maneuvers for a political deal,
where its role would be maximized.73
Various Salafi (Islamic fundamentalist) groups exist in eastern
Afghanistan, particularly in Kunar and Nuristan provinces, and some have
declared a jihad against the government and the foreign armies. Although
Salafism is predominant at the popular level in these two provinces, the
Salafis’ military role is marginal. In the past they had troubled relations
with both Hizb-i Islami and Taliban, but seemed in early 2011 to operate
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together with them.74 They account for less than 1 percent of the
insurgency.
Al Qaida had a small presence in Afghanistan by late 2010, with
probably tens rather than hundreds of cadres operating in Afghan territory.
These cadres operated mainly as advisers, specialists, and trainers, giving
them a greater value than their small numbers would suggest. Al Qaida
cooperated closely with the Taliban, or at least selected commanders, but
ceased sending relatively large teams of fighters into Afghanistan, in part
because of the negative reactions that groups of foreign fighters were
eliciting from both the general population and Taliban fighters alike.75 It is
difficult to judge Al Qaida’s strategy in Afghanistan, but certainly they
oppose negotiations and will try to do whatever they can to sabotage them.
Their likely strategy is to keep the Afghan front open as long as possible
in order to weaken the American enemy and prevent a future intervention
in the Arab world.
Several Pakistani jihadist organizations fight from time to time in
Afghan territory, most typically some factions of the Pakistani Taliban and
Lashkar-e Taiba; their men are usually found not far from the Pakistani
border. Their numbers vary greatly depending on the season and
developments in Pakistan itself; on average their strength can be estimated
around 3 to 4 percent of the insurgency as a whole, that is, never
exceeding 2,000.76 Pakistani jihadist groups are certainly more exposed to
Pakistani pressure and might to a large extent share Pakistan’s goals in
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Afghanistan; they would support a negotiated settlement if that was
sponsored by the Pakistanis.
Central Asian jihadist movements are increasingly found in
northern Afghanistan, where they appear to have been integrated into the
Taliban structure and work to recruit young Afghan Uzbeks to the cause.
The fighting strength of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (the largest
of these groups) is probably no more than 1 percent of the strength of the
insurgency.77 They have shown no interest in a peace that could deny them
access to Central Asia. The presence of Chechens is reported, although
they are more likely to be tens than hundreds; they tend to serve as trainers
and weapons specialists.
There are also some independent Afghan jihadists, who are not
affiliated with any organization. They seem relatively abundant in western
Afghanistan, where some receive support from Iran. On the whole, they
probably do not account for more than 2 percent to 3 percent of the
strength of the insurgency.78
Among the opposition groups, Hizb-i Islami is most likely to
attract portions of the educated class, although the Taliban are also known
to have made an effort. This radical Islamist group has been recruiting
among university students since the 1970s and continues to do so. If the
armed opposition attracts urban dwellers in any numbers, they are likely to
come from the youth. Taliban presence and recruitment is reported in most
universities, while Hizb-i Islami is strong among students, particularly in
Jalalabad. There is also a stream of Taliban recruits among the noneducated urban youth, but these are mostly recent immigrants into the
cities, who remain socially marginalized and have also been culturally
alienated by the contrast between urban and rural mores.79
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B. Pro-Government Armed Groups
The most significant armed groups emerging from Operation
Enduring Freedom were Jamiat-i Islami, Junbesh-i Milli-ye Islami, and
Hizb-i Wahdat. Jamiat-i Islami is a moderate Islamist group led by
Professor Rabbani, loosely organized around a collection of strongmen,
and mostly composed of Tajiks from the northeastern, western, and
northern regions as well as the central region around Kabul; from 2002
onwards it has shown a tendency towards internal fragmentation. Junbeshi Milli-ye Islami is a secular group gathered around Gen. Dostum, mostly
composed of Uzbeks from northern Afghanistan and with regionalist
claims; this group also has been weakening politically and militarily in
recent years and has suffered many defections. Hizb-i Wahdat is a Shiite
group originally of Khomeninist inclinations and then increasingly driven
by Hazara nationalism, based in central Afghanistan; this group has
splintered into several rival factions.
Many local military leaders linked to the factions above are now
on the loose and dedicated to criminal activities; some collaborate with the
insurgency. The best-known example is Ghulam Yahya, a former
commander of Jamiat in Herat, who until his death in fall 2009 was
emerging as the leading Taliban commander in the province. Among
Pashtuns, pro-government armed groups have almost entirely been
absorbed into the police. Some local military leaders have been
incorporated in a range of government-sponsored militias that started
forming in 2009.80
Several other groups were minor players in terms of their influence
and military power. Probably over 6,000 inactive militias are currently
present in the country, often indistinguishable from criminal gangs.
80

See M. Lefebvre, Local Defence in Afghanistan: A Review of Government-backed
Initiatives (Kabul: Afghanistan Analysts Network, 2010).

68

GIUSTOZZI: TALIBAN NETWORKS IN AFGHANISTAN

Hundreds of private security companies exist with anywhere between
40,000 to 70,000 armed guards, many of whom are unregistered.
Afghanistan’s police are often staffed by militias linked to political
factions, especially but not exclusively in southern Afghanistan. These
police-militias are often keen enemies of the Taliban, but are undisciplined
and can have a contentious relationship with local people, which
contributes to increasing hostility toward the government amongst the
population.81
The Afghan army is considered by many sources—government,
military, and local populations—to be more disciplined than the police,
although many of its officers do have a background in the anti-Taliban
factions and maintain some allegiance to them. The militias have not been
able to infiltrate the army, and former militiamen have only been admitted
on an individual basis. Although the army’s interaction with the local
population is not nearly as difficult as the police force’s, questions about
their motivation to fight have been raised. Moreover, the Afghan army is
completely dependent on ISAF’s support, both in terms of logistics and
firepower (close air support) and, more worrying, for leadership rather
than just advice or training. This makes their sustainability after ISAF’s
withdrawal difficult to predict.82

Discussion Questions

1.
Considering the wide array of ideologically and
opportunistically driven combatants in Afghanistan, including Chechens,
Pakistani proxy groups, various Taliban offshoots, Iranian paramilitants,
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Al Qaeda, Hizbi-i Islami and the Haqqani network, what opportunities
exist for exploiting said combatants’ seams and gaps?
2.
What has been the impact of other armed opposition groups
on the Taliban’s strategy, identity, and influence?

70

GIUSTOZZI: TALIBAN NETWORKS IN AFGHANISTAN

Annex E: The Afghan Government
The Bonn Agreement and the Ruling Coalition
The 2001 Bonn agreement (officially the Agreement on
Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of
Permanent Government Institutions) was reached as the Taliban regime
was being overthrown by a joint offensive of US forces and anti-Taliban
factions. The agreement established an interim government, the Afghan
Interim Authority, which had a six-month mandate, which was supposed
to be followed by a two-year transitional authority. The new interim
authority featured a coalition among all anti-Taliban groups. The most
prominent was Jamiat-i Islami, which had already taken military control of
Kabul as well as portions of northeastern, northern, central, and eastern
Afghanistan. The Jamiatis agreed to Hamid Karzai taking the interim
presidency, probably because they judged him a weak pliable figurehead
whom they could control and use in handling the Pashtun half of the
population, among which they had little influence.83
However, the Bonn coalition started disintegrating relatively
rapidly, with significant tensions emerging as early as 2002. Karzai and
his closest allies, encouraged by their Western allies, moved to gradually
expand their influence and break up Jamiat’s monopoly over the security
sector. From 2003 onwards, Jamiat’s hold over the security sector started
to erode, although it was never eradicated. The anti-Jamiat camp,
however, was divided between technocrats with a penchant for institution
building and Karzai’s own group, which gradually showed a greater and
greater interest in building a patrimonial system around the president
himself and his family. Personal interests played a role in these
developments, but there was also a genuine debate on what system of
government would be most effective in managing Afghanistan. Among
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Westerners, there was by no means unanimity in favor of institution
building, even if the principle was never openly challenged.84
The political situation continued to deteriorate. From 2005
onwards, President Karzai, by then elected by popular mandate and
therefore on more solid ground in terms of international legitimacy,
increasingly displayed irritation towards his Western patrons and advisers.
He apparently resented them for putting pressure on him to take steps that
he felt undermined his internal base of support and for providing what he
believed was unsound and unrealistic advice. The rift deepened during the
2008 U.S. presidential campaign when the Democrats started attacking
President Karzai and his patrimonial system. Leaks of information and
diplomatic incidents during 2009 consolidated Karzai’s lack of faith and
trust in his American partners and strengthened his belief that they would
eventually move to undermine or replace him. Karzai reacted to these
developments by intensifying his efforts to build an autonomous power
base, sometimes even trying to tap xenophobic and anti-Western feelings
among the population. 85
However, Karzai did not have everything his own way. It proved
very difficult to reduce the influence that Jamiat-i Islami had established
over the security apparatus (army, police, and intelligence) in 2001-02.
Changing individuals at the top of the structure did not yield many results.
Although by 2010 it could not be said that Jamiat enjoyed the same kind
of near-monopoly over key positions it had in 2002, it was still strongly
overrepresented. Its position in the Ministry of Interior was strengthened
as a result of the appointment of Bismillah Mohammadi, one of its
members, as minister in 2010, while President Karzai and his allies were
trying to weaken it in the Ministry of Defense and in the National
Directorate of Security. Political appointments and political purges did not
A. Giustozzi, “The Political Economy of International Post-Conflict Statebuilding in
Afghanistan.”
85
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have positive repercussions on the security forces. Some turmoil was
reported among Pashtun police officers, who accused Bismillah of
bringing in Jamiatis and allies, as well as among Tajik and Hazara officers
and troops in the army, who in turn resented the appointment of Pashtuns
as their superiors by Karzai’s allies.86
The viability of the security forces as effective organizations was
also affected by political turmoil. In autumn 2009, the country seemed
about to enter a phase of more direct confrontation between Jamiat and
Karzai’s supporters due to a huge rift over the rigged presidential
elections. Recruitment into the army and police collapsed as a result.
Large pay raises and the resolution of the political crisis helped avert a
full-blown crisis, but the episode highlighted the potential impact of
political rivalry on the security forces.
At the time of writing in summer 2011, many government officials
are poorly motivated in their fight against the Taliban for a variety of
reasons. In the large majority of cases, this is not due to any sympathy for
the Taliban. Although collaboration with the insurgents exists within the
police and the provincial administrations, the problem primarily lies with
the lack of employment opportunities in Afghanistan. Many government
officials entered government service out of practical financial
considerations, which in turn means a modest inclination to take personal
risks. The Taliban’s campaign of assassinations, every year taking the
lives of hundreds of government officials and other pro-government
individuals, has a significant impact in discouraging people from working
for the government and encouraging those who do to keep a low profile.
During the Marja phase of Operation Mushtarak in early 2010, it proved
very difficult to convince government officials to volunteer for the job of
manning the new district administration of Marja, despite the incentives
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offered.87 Moreover, in a province like Kandahar, where the assassination
campaign has been particularly intense, about two-thirds of the positions
in the provincial administration are vacant.
At the top levels of government, a laid-back attitude towards the
conflict seems to be predominant; the government is mainly concerned
about its political survival and has little interest in decisively ending a
conflict that is bringing an unprecedented amount of external support to
Afghanistan. It wasn’t until 2010 that the Afghan Ministry of Interior
began to tackle the outflow of trained police officers towards private
security companies, which has been a major problem in trying to increase
the capacity of the police force. Many government officials own private
security companies or are linked to them, which might be one reason for
this slow response.88
While there is a consensus that corruption and ineffective
government agencies are a major source of support or at least tolerance for
the insurgents, the Afghan government has not shown any willingness to
fight corruption. Instead, they are trying to hamper any internationally led
effort in that direction. Corruption has been used as a tool of co-optation,
to buy political support, and it is now very difficult for the government to
weed it out. 89At the same time, the government does not want the conflict
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to escalate out of control and is worried about maintaining and expanding
its external base of support in the event of a Western disengagement.
Discussion Questions

1.
What effect did the Bonn agreement have on Afghanistan’s
political system? How did a multinational NATO leadership environment
influence those effects?
2.
How did the disintegration of Jamait-I Islami affect the
security climate?
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Annex F: Regional Powers and U.S./Allies
A. Pakistan
All the regional powers surrounding Afghanistan see developments
as affecting their status and geopolitical interests. Pakistan is the most
obvious case. Despite having long been an ally of the United States, the
Pakistani military establishment felt bitter because of the deterioration in
relations that followed the end of Soviet presence in Afghanistan and the
U.S. reaction to its nuclear program. As a result, the Pakistanis stopped
trusting the Americans. They believe that U.S. presence in Afghanistan
destabilizes the whole region and that permanent U.S. military bases in
Afghanistan could eventually be used against Pakistan, or at least against
Pakistani interests.
After the fall of the Taliban regime at the end of 2001, the
Pakistanis felt that Washington paid little attention to their interests in
Afghanistan and did not help Islamabad place its clients within the Afghan
ruling coalition; some low-profile efforts to launch a Taliban political
party faltered in 2002 after attracting little support in Washington or
Kabul. Washington believed that guarantees that Afghanistan would not
develop a powerful army would reassure the Pakistani army, but the
Pakistanis were irked by India’s rapidly growing influence in Afghanistan.
The main anti-Taliban factions, brought to power by U.S. intervention in
2001, were perceived by the Pakistanis as politically close to India. Some
analysts suggest that the Indians might have tried to provoke the
Pakistanis into a reaction that would spoil the Washington-Islamabad
alliance: for example, India reopened consulates along the AfghanPashtun belt, bid for road-building contracts near the Pakistani border, and
deployed paramilitary forces to protect them.90
Sumit Ganguly and Nicholas Howenstein. “Pakistan and Afghanistan: Domestic
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As a result, factions within the Pakistani army and its security
service, the InterServices Intelligence, began to believe that in order to
regain leverage for themselves and for their Taliban proteges, they had to
demonstrate that Afghanistan could not be stabilized without involving
Pakistan. Originally, the plan to reorganize the Taliban was probably
modest, restricted to pressuring Kabul and Washington. The Taliban were
initially so weak that the Pakistani army either had to mobilize on their
behalf or allow Pakistani jihadist groups and networks of Taliban
sympathizers in Afghanistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA) and North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) to carry out armed
raids inside the country. Pakistani appetite seemed to have grown once the
prospects for a full-scale insurgency appeared more promising, starting in
2003. At that time, the Pakistani army became more involved in the
conflict, increasing its level of direct financial support for the insurgents
and even engaging ISAF and Afghan security forces along the border
between the two countries.
The Afghan Taliban leadership continues to reside in Pakistan,
mostly unthreatened. Most Taliban leaders arrested by the Pakistanis were
eventually released and none appears to have been killed. This is in direct
contrast to the fate of Al Qaida leaders, many of whom were killed in
Pakistani territory, even if some (notably Bin Laden himself) seems to
have lived under some form of protection in Pakistan.91
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B. India
India may have the strongest interest of any other regional power
in a stable and independent Afghanistan, which would likely be a natural
enemy of Pakistan by virtue of the long-standing border dispute between
those two countries. Since 1947, successive Afghan governments have
taken up the issue of the border, and even President Karzai has flirted with
the issue of claiming lost Afghan territories.92 Suggestions that
Afghanistan renounce its demands for the return of the Pashtun territories
lost at the end of the 19th century are not realistic, as whatever sense of
national identity Afghanistan has is based on the idea of Pashtunistan—
belonging based on ethnicity. However, India does not share a border with
Afghanistan and cannot afford massive levels of financial aid to offset
Pakistan’s ability to interfere directly in much of Afghanistan. 93 Its active
intervention, therefore, has been limited.
C. Iran
The other regional power that has been very active in Afghanistan
after 2001 is Iran. The Iranians welcomed the removal of the Taliban
regime, which they viewed as too close to the Saudis.94 The Iranians first
approached the Taliban in 2005, initially with low-profile help, mainly
aimed at establishing contact. Since then, relations between the Iranian
Revolutionary Guards and selected Taliban commanders have warmed,
and the level of support appears to have increased relentlessly in 2008-09.
Reports emerged in 2010 that Taliban leadership had approached the
Revolutionary Guards for Iranian support to the Taliban as a whole, as
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opposed to selected commanders in the field. Reports also suggest that the
Revolutionary Guards have been training Taliban fighters since 2009.95
D. Russia
In comparison, Russia has generally maintained a low profile in
the post-2001 conflict. Moscow seems to view Afghanistan as an
opportunity for extracting some concessions from Washington on other
fronts, rather than as an area of direct interest. In 2009-10, with Central
Asian Islamists turning up in northern Afghanistan and starting to infiltrate
Tajikistan, Afghanistan acquired a new importance to Moscow and some
greater cooperation with the Afghan security forces started.
E. American and Allied Interests
The United States entered Afghanistan in 2001 for obvious
reasons; no government could have avoided retaliating for attacks on the
motherland. With the rapid demise of the Taliban in early 2002, however,
U.S. aims in Afghanistan became more blurred. Washington appears not
have had a well-defined plan for Afghanistan beyond establishing a
friendly government. This helps explain why the growing Taliban
insurgency that started in 2003 initially received scant attention in
Washington. Even after the insurgency appeared to be a serious threat in
2006, the United States did not mobilize considerable resources for
Afghanistan for another two years. Moreover, even then there was no
coherent, holistic plan on how the newly available resources should be
spent, which meant that little was achieved in terms of stemming the rise
of the insurgency. Finally, Washington paid little attention to institution
95
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building in Afghanistan, relying instead on personal connections with
President Karzai and other key players to maintain a rapport; in turn,
Karzai’s own patrimonial inclinations aroused few objections in
Washington.96
The attitude in Western Europe was very different from the
American approach on most counts. The Europeans had no reason for
being in Afghanistan other than the desire to maintain a constructive
relationship with the U.S. within NATO; as a result, they were only
prepared to commit a limited number of resources and energy to the war.97
As the conflict escalated, the Europeans started regretting their sometimes
high-profile involvement and downsized their role. By 2010, most
European players in Afghanistan wanted to find a way out of the UNendorsed peacekeeping operation that had unexpectedly turned into a war.
Apart from the British and the Danes, the Europeans had never fully
committed to combat in Afghanistan. In private and increasingly in public,
this was played out as a shift in strategies; the dominant thinking in 2010
was to move the effort toward training Afghan policemen and soldiers and
to gradually withdraw the European combat units.98
To the extent that they were committed to the counterinsurgency
effort, each European army had its own doctrine. The British and the
French particularly guarded their COIN traditions. Even then, each new
commander, particularly in the less centralized British system, introduced
his own version of how to fight the war. This was also true of the
Americans: in the absence of clear political directives coming from
Washington, each U.S. commander stressed different aspects of the
counterinsurgency effort. 99
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Seth Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires (New York: Norton, 2009).
The same applies to other American allies present in Afghanistan, such as the
Canadians and the Australians.
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Personal communications with Western diplomats, 2009-11.
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Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop; personal communications with British
army officers and diplomats, 2009-11.
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With OEF playing a marginal role in Afghanistan after 2008, ISAF
became by far the dominant foreign player. ISAF had a bureaucratically
driven mission without its own aims until 2009, when it became more goal
oriented after acquiring stronger leadership under first Gen. McChrystal
and then Gen. Petraeus. Moreover, ISAF has transitioned from being
largely reactive with long delays to being increasingly proactive and has
made efforts to seize the initiative from the Taliban and break the
momentum of the insurgency.
There is some inherent tension between the goals of the military
and those of the politicians, which at times has surfaced dramatically, in
particular with the dismissal of Gen. McChrystal from his job in 2010.
Short of any external constraints, the military seemed to be inclined to
fight until they are confident that they can claim victory; the politicians are
more in a hurry and want the war wrapped up relatively quickly.
Budgetary worries, including the estimated war cost for the United States
of US$120 billion in 2010, add to the politicans’ sense of urgency, but
there are also strategic reasons for disengaging: with almost the whole US
armed force tied up in Afghanistan, a serious crisis occurring anywhere
else in the world would be hard to respond to. Indeed, early 2011
developments within the Arab world highlighted how Washington’s
strategic concerns do not end in Afghanistan.100
The Taliban, probably advised by allies inside Pakistan, are aware
of this gap and feel encouraged to stay the course. They seem to expect
that the military pressure coming from ISAF simply will not be
sustainable in the medium and long term. They also try to maintain a high
level of violence in order to demonstrate that the increased military
pressure is not achieving its aims. They are ready to pay a political cost for

Woodward, Obama’s Wars; Michael Hastings, “King David's War,” Rolling Stone,
February 2, 2011.
100
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it, for example by appointing radical commanders who will be difficult to
control later but are keen to fight and ready to risk their lives.101
Discussion Questions

1.

What is Pakistan’s interest in Afghanistan in regards to

India?
2.
Between Pakistani, Indian, Iranian, and Russian national
interests in Afghanistan, who has the most to lose and gain from the
current conflict?

101

Linschoten and Kuehn, The Enemies We Create.
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